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Introduct ion: Beyond IT

I

n 2002 during my first fieldwork trip to Bangalore, I met Nandan Nilekani,
then the chief executive officer and one of the founders of Infosys Limited,
the site of my fieldwork.! He argued that the best evidence of the emergence
of India as a "powerhouse" is visible when software engineers migrate to the
West. He presented a particular vignette: "When my boys go to the u.s. to
work on a client site, they go through the immigration process with pride because even the immigration officer knows that he is not there to work at a gas
station or a convenience store. He is there because the u.s. needs him to program software for them." The skewed gender and class nature of the vignette
aside, what this points to is the emergence of a new nationalistic narrative.
Such narratives were also palpable in the IT company I worked with,
which was headquartered in Princeton, New Jersey, with an offshore office
in Hyderabad, in the southern Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. The majority
of the software engineers and developers were Indian, mostly on H -IB work
visas from India. When my Indian colleagues learned about my research
topic, they encouraged me by pointing out that I was doing something "valuable" for our country. They collectively agreed that if there is "one thing" of
phenomenal importance in India now, it is the rise of the Indian information
technology (IT) industry on the global scene. They were also gratified that
software engineers like them would be at the center of my work. One notion
l. Info sys, one of th e leading IT companies in India, was establish ed in 1981 and ea rn ed
$8 .25 billion in revenue in FY 2014.
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that seemed to consistently underscore these preliminary conversations was
that the IT industry flourished in a country otherwise relegated to underdevelopment, poverty, hunger, and corruption. Therefore, it is especially important that such success be celebrated and owned as a national pride.
It is rather interesting to note that the "pride" is primarily based on derivative work; that is, the majority of software development is designed to
support the business processes of corporations in the West. The Indian IT
industry has little to do with innovative work or program development. For
instance, at the time of my fieldwork, Infosys had only one product, Finacle,
developed for banking solutions. In February 2014 Infosys set up a subsidiary,
EdgeVerve Systems, to concentrate its products, platforms, and solutions. The
products and platforms currently account for only 5.2 percent of the $8.2 billion of the revenue of the company.2 When I wanted Nandan Nilekani to explain the dearth of investment in products, he mentioned that the company's
expertise lies in software development, and that is what Infosys is known to do
well. In this context, Xiang Biao's Global Body Shopping examines a possibly
unique Indian practice called "body shopping" in the IT trade between India
and other countries, especially in the West. Body shopping is a practice where
"an Indian-run consultancy (body shop) anywhere in the world recruits IT
workers, in most cases from India, to be placed out as project-based labor
with different clients" (Biao 2007: 4).3 While Infosys is no longer a primarily body-shopping company, this practice lends perspective to the Indian IT
industry in the global context. As Biao argues, it is noticeable that software
development is also premised on low-priced, English-speaking labor available
in India. These kinds of global practices are inherently produced through
the realignment of historic unequal global relations. Second, the IT process
rather than embedding Indian IT professionals in the global circuit in effect
makes them more vulnerable, hence dis embedding them.4

. 2. "Infosys Hives Off Products BUSiness into Separate Unit," Times ofllldia, May 12, 2014,
avalla ble at http://timesofindia .i ndiati mes .com/tech/tech -news/! nfosys- hives-off- prod ucts- busi
ness-tnto-s eparate-unit/articleshow/34989367.cms (accessed September 26, 2014).
3: For a detailed discussion about the rise of the Indian IT industry in the national and internatlOnal perspective, see Heeks (1996), Kumar (2001), Lakha (1990, 1994), Lateef (1996) , Parthasarathy (2004), Saxenian (2000), and Upadhya (2004).
4. A conversation about the importance of innovation to sustain the Indian IT industry in
the global market is slowly emerging, led by the National Association for Software and Services
Compantes (NASSCOM), the trade association for the industry. This is partly fueled by the economic dow~,turn and partly by other countries rising as software development destinations. For
detaIls, see Innovation-A Call for Action for the IT/BPM Industry," available at http://www
.nasscom.in/sites/default/files/uploads/mailers/2013/CEO_Forum_Decoding_Innovation_ Post
- eve2 t_24052 013/docs/Decoding_Innovation_1 7May20 13_Synopsis.pd f (accessed October 2014);
and InnovatlOn Transforming the Growth Landscape: Capitalizing IP in Indian IT/BPM," available at http://www.kpmg.comIIN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/lnno
vatlOn-Transforming-the-growth_landscape.pdf (accessed October 2014).
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Notwithstanding the shallow foundation on which the pride of Indian
IT is based, the narratives are nonetheless vital ethnographic data. It is my
argument that the IT pride is not limited to economics alone. It further, and
perhaps more importantly, incorporates a strong ethical dimension. My colleagues at work narrated the success of IT as an ethical watershed for the
nation-state. Adjectives such as "honest," "good," "not corrupt," "reliable,"
"educated," "good background," and so on, were often evoked to describe
IT professionals, especially high-profile entrepreneurs.s For a country, especially the state, generally known to engage in corrupt practices, where global
business would not venture easily, things changed with IT; they argued, "We
have become more trustworthy as a country." In this view, the IT industry
has carved out an ethical space that is distinct from and in disdain of the
"corrupt" state. Two words that I encountered ceaselessly, which, as software
professionals often reminded me, were at the core of global corporate governance and the market ideals, were "accountability" and "transparency." The
market rhetoric therefore goes beyond sheer economics; it is also a normative
tool that ensures uncompromising honesty in economic transactions.
What does an ethnography of neoliberalism look like? This book is an effort in that direction. It is about the narratives, discursive practices, and contestations through which a neoliberal critique of public governance emerges,
thickens, and is also subverted in contemporary India. The critique plausibly
emanated with the success of the IT industry, but, as I demonstrate, it is more
importantly a politically and ethically negotiated narrative that coalesced
over time to become an identifying account mainly of the urban middle
class. I emphaSize the class characteristic of the narrative to show how, on one
hand, neoliberalism privileges the middle class, and, on the other hand, also
provokes a different kind of politics of rights among the urban poor. I argue
for a constitutive relationship between the ideology of the IT industry and the
emerging neoliberal ideology of the polity without privileging either. Hence,
my attention here is on Simultaneity rather than on causality. Simultaneity
compels us to look beyond boundaries, of IT in this case, to explore sites
that are now being folded into the neoliberal schema. This book is therefore
also about going beyond IT. The "beyond" in this instance is a water project,
known as the Greater Bangalore Water and Sewerage Project (GBWASP;
henceforth, Water Project), that would not only privatize water supply but
also required a beneficiary capital contribution from citizens, often referred
to as "customers." Water offers us the kind of "beyond" that unsettles the
otherwise euphoric national narrative ofIT. This "beyond" corroborates that
the narrative is inherently embedded within and asymmetrically privileges
the middle and upper-middle classes.
5. Smitha Radhakrishnan examines "backgro und " in deta il as a key word in the IT industry;
she argues that the term oscillates between "claim to univers ality and relativity" (2011: 8).

..
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In this newfound basis of class politics, belonging in the nation-state is
once again fractured into bits, simultaneously familiar and unfamiliar. Bits
in its metaphorical extension-BITS, as in the digital vernacular-is a binary,
it takes the value of either 1 or O. Binary digits store information and are the
basic unit of communication in computing. A logical value of 1 is considered
a true statement, and 0 is a false statement. The market paradigm post-1991 is
parallel to the 1 BIT as the logically true statement. It leaves the other existing
option, the socialist-redistributive model, 0, as a false choice. In a modernist
model such as this, the choice is obvious, legible, and privileged. Thus one
gradually ceases to belong to the nation-state as a citizen based solely on
birthright. Belonging is based on an active participation in the market and
also in accepting the market as the only viable option for the polity to prosper.
In another sense, it is the acceptance of the logical value 1 as the true statement of the BIT and discarding 0 as obsolete.
I gathered success stories through ethnographic work with IT professionals in Bangalore, the Silicon Valley ofIndia, and collectively call them the "IT
narrative." The establishment of an Indian industry in the knowledge economy otherwise dominated by the West had an effect beyond fiscal reports.
It has instilled a sense of confidence among the IT professionals that they
can now offer better leadership to the country based on their experience of
competing and succeeding on a global scale. My analyses of the success narrative of the IT industry generated the following set of values and principles
espoused by entrepreneurs and software engineers. First, the IT industry in
India succeeded not merely for the software knowledge and English-language
skills available in the country but also because the IT companies meticulously
adhered to the ethical corporate practices stipulated by global capital. Second,
~he success of IT offers a blueprint for governance, which can and should
mform both private and pUblic sectors. Third, the success narrative has lifted
India from its enduring status as a poor developing country, and this opportunity ought to be utilized for a nationwide governance and institutional
reform, especially for the state. Fourth, the reforms can be effective by incorporating citizens, who believe in the power of the market as a transformative
tool, within the public administrative apparatus.
Together, I term the above set of values the ethico-political ideology of
the IT industry to emphasize its ethical nature, but also to indicate how
the emergent set of ethics has established a new politics of belonging to the
nation-state. While this book deciphers the cultural drivers and historical
contingencies that underscore and manufacture the IT narrative, more importantly it problematizes the cohesiveness and legitimacy of the narrative itself. The apparent tidiness of the narrative intrigued me for two reasons: first,
its seemingly unproblematic passage from the economic/corporate/capitalist
to the social/public governance realm. I ask what enables these successful
corporate entrepreneurs to offer gUidelines for renewing the nation, which
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has two distinct domains-one relies on the market, the other on a fictive
bond connected by birth and land. The question is not only about the passage
of this narrative but also what makes IT possible at this particular historical
juncture. Second, and I think more importantly, when we realize that the IT
success narrative is one primarily of and by the middle class, it starts to fray at
the edges. How does one account for class differences in a narrative that favors
the market ideology? How does one understand the disenfranchisement of the
poorer sections of the citizenry who are unable to participate in the market
paradigm of change? What kind of class politics does this narrative provoke
and suppress? In other words, who becomes the privileged citizen of the nation is now a question of whether one is "inside" or "outside" IT.
The inside and outside, as I show in this work, does not necessarily mean
that one is employed in the IT industry. Relatively, it is an indication of an
ideological divide of those who share and participate in the market ideals
and those who do not, or rather cannot. Using ideology to depict the set of
values is at once a simple and a difficult task. Linking this ethico-political
narrative to the middle-class and upper-middle-class IT entrepreneurs and
professionals is to suggest that ideology is "a system of beliefs characteristic
of a particular class or group" (Williams 1977: 55).
In the Marxian sense, ideology arises out of the material processes that
organize economic relations, but it is nonetheless a "false consciousness." Engels explained, "Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker,
consciously indeed but with a false consciousness. The real motives impelling him remain unknown to him, otherwise it would not be an ideological
process at all" (quoted in Williams 1977: 65). Raymond Williams has argued
that the separation of the consciousness as a "reflective" or a "second" stage
poses a difficult problem for conceptualizing ideology since consciousness
itself, he argues, is formed through material social processes (Williams 1977).
While Marx underscored the importance of material and social history that
enhanced the concept of ideology, moving it beyond scientific empiricism
proposed by Destutt de Tracy, his negation of "what men say" and "men as
narrated" or from language itself, as Williams contended, created an enduring conceptual uncertainty (Williams 1977). In emphasizing the IT narrative,
I draw attention to ideology not only as emerging from the material social
relations of software development, a process that spans the globe, but also
what the IT entrepreneurs say and how they are being narrated, for instance,
by the media, as the harbingers of the neoliberal market. Finally, how does
language come to delineate the new set of values and principles or, in other
words, the IT ideology?
In the context of a class analysis, a couple of characteristics are unique
to the IT industry in India: First, its emergence independent of the older
business model that was linked to family businesses or established corporations; second, the educated middle class, who were the main founders of IT
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companies, drew on their social capital to establish a different corporate norm
(Upadhya 2004). Both these characteristics were reflected in the narrative
alongside class privilege. Further, Leela Fernandes has argued that there is
a need to move beyond the obvious contribution scholars have made either
"estimating the size of the middle class" or "analyz[ing] the middle class
through the lens of consumption" (2006: xvii). Fernandes instead explores the
political routes through which an entrenched connection among the middle
class, consumption practices, and liberalization evolve while simultaneously
. rguing that the middle class is not a monolith.
Fernandes's invitation is useful because it leads us to look at processes
through which the middle class garners, retains, and normalizes emergent
ideologies and practices. Therefore, what troubled me about the connection
that I heard being formulated among IT professionals, IT's middle-class
proponents, and the nation-state was twofold. First, the narrative leap: If IT
benefits the educated urban middle class, somehow it will be beneficial for
India as a whole. Second, related to this, the high acoustics of the IT narrative was drowning out issues of inequality that were being introduced by the
same 1990s liberalization policies that enabled the ascent of IT. Where do
people from the lower social economic strata find their place in this changing
economic terrain? Or, seen from a slightly different angle, if IT contributes
9.5 percent to the GDP,6 how does it become relevant for the entire nation
relative to others sector with higher contributions, for instance, the manufacturing sector (15.2 percent in 2012-2013)t Moreover, even though the
IT entrepreneurs I knew at Infosys upheld the class mobility offered by the
industry, the education and soft skills one needed to secure a job in IT were
middle-class privileges. Consequently, as I started this work in 2002, it soon
became apparent that to tell the "success" story ofIndian IT, one had to move
"outside" the industry.
The resulting matter that arises here is relationship among IT, the state,
and neoliberalism. Would IT succeed without neoliberal state policies? Perhaps. Does the visibility ofIT exclusively rest on a "failing" state? This question demands a more nuanced exploration. The contradistinction erected
between the ethics of the IT narrative and the "corruption" of the state cannot
be simply relegated to the chronological "failure" of the state and the "success"
of IT; neither can we see the latter merely as a direct outcome of the former.
Rather, the field of possibility within which the IT narrative rose and gained
traction has to do with the confluence of global and national processes that
began propagating the market over socialist-redistributive state agendas.
. 6 . NASSCOM, "Impact on India's Growth," available at http: //www. nasscom.in/impact
-mdlas-growth (accessed April 6, 2015).
7. Available at http://articles.economictimes. indiatimes.com12013- 05-12/news/39203854_1
_assocham-survey-100-million-jobs-manufactur ing_sector (accessed May 10, 2013).
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Undoubtedly, the Indian state, especially under the leadership of the Congress
Party, has had a protracted and legendary scale of corruption, but to argue
that IT's visibility solely depended on this is to miss the larger forces of neoliberal change that are sweeping the globe. The 2014 election is a case in point.
The Congress Party lost the elections by a significant margin to the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP); Nandan Nilekani, who ran for office on the Congress
ticket, lost. There are local- and state-level distinctions of electoral politics in
India, but it is also important to attend to neoliberal forces that increasingly
undermine the legitimacy of the state as suitable for public governance. Therefore, this book does not argue for causality between the "success" of IT and
the "failure" of the state. Instead it is an invitation to examine the complexity
of neoliberalism, especially in India starting in the 1990s.

N

eoliberalism as a concept is neither succinct nor analytically constant.
There is also the accompanying intellectual dread that while neoliberalism could be a useful concept to capture the field of possibility, it may also
be diluted as a mere placeholder in contemporary anthropological research. s
In a 2014 Annual Review of Anthropology article, Tejaswini Ganti identifies
two ways in which anthropologists have primarily used neoliberalism: "one is
concerned with poliCies and politics and the other with ideologies and values"
(Ganti 2014: 94). I find David Harvey's formulation of neoliberalism especially
helpful for my analysis here because it underscores the coupling of values and
ideals within the public institutional framework.
Harvey writes:
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic
practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced
by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within
an institutional framework characterized by strong private property
rights,free market and free trade. The role of the state is to create and
preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices.
(2007: 2)9

As we can see, freedom here does not quite relate to a democratic mandate and citizens' rights. Instead it is tied to the unfettered possibility of
8. In January 2013 the University of Manchester Group of Debates in Anthropological Theory
discussed a motion titled "The Concept ofNeoliberalism Has Become an Obstacle to the Anthropological Understanding of the Twenty-First Century." Interestingly the final vote went for support
of the concept (Ganti 2014). Available at http://www.talkinganthropology.com/2013/01118/ta45
-gdatl-neoliberalisml! (accessed October 6, 2014).
9. Emphasis mine.
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securing private property, where the state enables a market' structure that
privileges the already privileged. "Freedom," as Harri Englund notes, "is an
essentially contested concept. Philosophical debates aside, the exportation of
'freedom' across historical periods and geopolitical areas have given the terlXl
new meanings, which are often ill-understood by those who have a specific
agenda to pursue" (2006: 2). This idea of freedom, in addition, creates a neVv"
subjectivity that dissociates from the collective to settle on the individual as
its point of reference. Nikolas Rose has written that "freedom is the name We
give today to a kind of power one brings to bear upon oneself, and bringing
power to bear upon others ... and freedom is particularly problematic when
we demand to be governed in its name" (1999: 96). This emergence has deep
implications for a democratic regime since it signals, contrary to what some
scholars have suggested, not the end of politics but a politics that is admissible
only when filtered through a preset script of resistance and response.
Ganti makes another valuable distinction, that is, between "late capital_
ism" and "neoliberalism," emphasizing two points of divergences. First, late
capitalism is a chronological marker, whereas neoliberalism is an "ideological
and philosophical movement ... that emerges at a particular historical mo_
ment" facilitated by network of intellectuals (Friedrich August von Hayek~
Walter Lippman, Milton Friedman, and others) and institutions (Mon. t
Pelerin Society) (Ganti 2014: 91). Second, neoliberalism is characterized by a
call for a prescriptive arrangement between the state and its citizens to reOl:"_
ganize capital and property (Ganti 2014). Neoliberal futures are hence aspi_
rational and call for a discontinuity with past forms of welfare governance.
The discontinuity is a normative stipulation for the market to masquerade as
an impeccable logiC of well-being. Above all, I take seriously Ganti's (201'1)
suggestion that neoliberalism as an analytical concept helps us ground ethno_
graphic work to think through processes of globalization that are otherwiSe
diffuse and obscure.
IT professionals demonstrated a high regard for the market rather tha~
the state as an underwriter for their well-being or, as they frequently eJ<;:_
pressed it, "the good life." They often presented private property they hact
acquired, which was "unthinkable" for their parents, such as owning a flat by
the time one was thirty, cars, high-end gadgets, shopping trips to the mall
dining at eclectic restaurants, international vacations, and so on, as marker~
of their well-being. Still, I often noticed that the narratives of personal suc_
cess and possessions often elevated from the personal to the national level
somewhat surreptitiously and quite naturally. The intertwining of individual
biographies and the national trajectory indicated a deeper belief in the poten_
tial of the market to alleviate India from the stigma of being a poor country-.
This, as Paul Treanor has suggested, reflects the "belief in the moral neceSSity
of market forces in the economy, [and) is probably the first defining feature o:{"

Introduction

9

market liberalism."lo In this sense, well-being as an experience was not necessarily confined to the IT workers. It was seen as a possibility for the nation as
a whole, realizable only through the state being invested in the mechanism
of the market.
On the other hand, it was quite remarkable to see that in nearly all the
conversations about "accountability" and "transparency," seldom did anyone
refer to its familiar humanistic merit. They were regularly cast in terms of
corporate values and practices, which were also apparently new to Indians.
I found it challenging to talk about these values in the famil iar humanist
domain in my discussions. While most professionals I interviewed acknowledged that these terms have long underscored collective life, they were reluctant to see these values now outside the corporation. Part of the reason, some
explained, is that with a balance sheet lurking at the end of every financial
quarter, one can see the tangible results-profit and loss-and hence the
moral urgency to be accountable and transparent. Others were skeptical that
such values could even work outside the supervision mechanism of the market, such as the " dashboard," which I discuss later, that companies like Infosys
use to track project timelines and employees' productivity. In other words, the
corporate governance paradigm was enumerative and protective. As Treanor
reminds us, "Neoliberalism is not simply an economic structure, it is a philosophy . . . neoliberals tend to see the world in terms of market metaphors."ll
One manager at Infosys explained the global relevance of "accountability" and "transparency" to me: "These could be daunting for people Who are
used to corruption, but this is what we have embraced as Our core v 1
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in Cairo. She links the two through the concept of "tacit knowledge," something shared by anthropology and neoliberalism. Contrary to Hayek's argument that tacit knowledge can only be harnessed in the free market and stems
from the public sector, Elyachar discovered the opposite in Cairo. Similar
to Elyachar's demonstration of the fahlawah (street smarts or trickery) as
important to the success of the public sector, state representatives working in
the Bangalore slums often had to draw on the existing network of favors and
vocabulary within the slum to convey the value of the project. Taken together
the above theorizations signify the complexity of neoliberalism rather than it
being a simple account of dispossession. Therefore, I document the struggles
that are inherent in the social margins and the collective knowledge that is
evoked, based on past experiences, to confront the powerful.

A

longside ."success," narratives of the "outside" were another related e.thnographlC data I collected during my fieldwork. It was an expressIOn
that IT workers habitually used to demarcate their lives and circumstances
from those who continue to be external spectators of IT. The inside of IT is
broader than the industry itself; it included the emerging middle classes who
are participating in the neoliberal market in different professional capacities,
such as in biotech, banking, real estate, and so on. IT in this sense stands as a
metaphor for the arrival of the middle class. The outside comprises those who
are unqualified to participate in or who are even undeserving of the "good
life," mainly because of their economic dispossession, such as the "urban
poor" in my research. The outside offers us an analytic opportunity to interrogate the picture of change embraced by IT. Stated differently, rather than
looking from outside IT, the outside is the window to look into IT. The IT
entrepreneurs at Infosys assertively told me that their commitment to social
change is not limited to the industry and is not even about the industry any
longer; according to them, by the late 1990s the industry had established an
"equitable" relationship with the state. The state, they stressed, was aware that
supporting the IT industry was critical for India to gain global recognition.
Therefore, Narayan Murthy (cofounder and chairman-emeritus of Infosys
Limited), Nandan Nilekani, and others insisted that I definitely look "outside"
IT, which is critical to their agenda of instituting market reforms in the state
apparatus. In this sense, the outside is in fact not incidental or merely adjacent to the inside-that is, IT-but is at its core. Yet, what came across in my
conversations at Infosys is that they perceived the outside as a homogeneous
domain that is malleable and easily amenable to market transformations.
Such a portrayal raised several questions. How does one account for the
dichotomy between IT and the outside? And why is the outside necessarily
perceived as "homogeneous"? What is at stake in this homogeneity when we
think of a neoliberal schema?
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II

The "outside" nonetheless posed an ethnographic challenge: What could
be an ideal research site? As I was seeking a possible site, Infosys invited me
to attend a citizens' meeting to discuss issues that are affecting city governance. They thought I would be interested because Nandan Nilekani was
one of the key speakers. I initially interpreted Nilekani's involvement as a
well-known denizen of the city. However, when I heard him speak that day,
it was obvious that he was promoting the market ideals that would streamline governance and improve citizen engagement. He stressed the value of
"accountability" and "transparency" while talking about a water project in
the city. Both these values that have guided his experience with corporate
governance, he argued, would be useful in organizing public governance,
as well. He urged the audience to rethink their relationship with the state,
particularly in relation to basic amenities such as water. Following this he
mentioned an impending water project known as Greater Bangalore Water
and Sewerage Project (Water Project) and the role of Janaagraha, a nongovernmental organization (NGO).
Janaagraha was organizing the citizens' participation component of the
Water Project that involved monitoring and holding the state accountable
for any delay and/or corruption. The Water and Sanitation Program of the
World Bank was funding this component. In the brief window I found during
lunch that day, I introduced myself to Ramesh Ramanathan, the cofounder
of Janaagraha, along with his wife, Swati Ramanathan. In order to gain a
sense of the "unique" work his NGO is involved in, Ramanathan invited me
to attend the "Monday Morning Meetings" at his organization, where they
present updates on the various projects. He assured me that ifI was interested
in measuring change, his organization would be a good place since "we are a
citizens' platform and work on re-engaging citizens with the state after a gap
of five decades."12 Nilekani and Ramanathan had worked together as part of
the Bangalore Agenda Task Force (BATF). The BATF was a public-private
initiative founded by the then chief minister of Karnataka, S. M. Krishna, to
reform urban governance in Bangalore. Therefore , like Nilekani, Ramanathan
trusted the market as the only tool that can bring about substantive changes
both in the way the state functions and how citizens can involve themselves
in governance as "stakeholders" of the nation. The Water Project, he stressed,
would be a useful area to study the renewed engagement between the state and
the citizens. At the end he said, "We do not need to reinvent the wheel if the
market has succeeded in every other area." Attending the citizens' meeting
that day led me to my "outside" infrastructural site.

12. At that time, the Ramanathans were reluctant to label Janaagraha as an NGO. TIley preferred to call it a "citizen's platform" to indicate its urban dimension and also to separate it from
the developmental paradigm, which is often seen as the domain of NG O work. I have discussed this
active delinking that the urban middl e class has embraced els ewh ere (Dasgupta 201 2).
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The study of infrastructure is not new but is developing as more focused
area of inquiry.13 In 2012 Cultural Anthropology curated a volume, which
dwelt on how scholars have started theorizing the subject of infrastructure
through ethnographic work. 14 Theoretically this ranges from thinking of
infrastructure as a "social-material assemblage" (Nikhil Anand) to how the
ordinariness of infrastructure is "appropriated and recombined" by users
(Jonathan Bach) and then how we can think of it through the mechanism of
gift and reciprocity (Daniel Mains). Elyachar, on the other hand, is reluctant
to theorize infrastructure yet because, she says, "At certain moments fuzzy
concepts are more helpful to capture the number of interlinked issues."ls
My own theorization of water supply as a question of infrastructure relates
to the above positions, but I am also interested in water being the paradigmatic case for the provision of basic amenities. Further, through this work,
I underscore how the vocabulary of the market, such as transparency, rather
ironically coincides with the nature of water. 16
The Water Project was designed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and primarily involved the privatization of
water funded jOintly by the beneficiary citizen contribution, market bonds,
mega city loan schemes, and the government of Karnataka. The continuity
of the market narrative between IT and the Water Project was remarkably
seamless and thorough as though they were identical areas of human life.
Throughout my fieldwork I found it quite arduous to engage people both at
Infosys and Janaagraha to attend to the specious similarities being drawn
between IT, a capitalist enterprise, and water, a basic and sacred amenity.
Though some partially acknowledged the difference, their overarching idea
was that by creating a water market one can end the water woes that plague
the city, and water scarcity was definitely a major infrastructure issue in
burgeoning Bangalore. Such awkward and unexpected interrelationships
have led to the rise of tensions, especially around basic amenities, that reflect
deeper schisms in a social order that was already premised on caste and class
hierarchies. The depth of neoliberalism, as Harvey writes, lies in the belief
that "if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health
care, social security or environmental pollution), then they must be created,
by state action if necessary" (2007: 2). The Water Project, in this case, was a

13. Susan Leigh Sta r's work was perhaps the fir st to dwell on thi s subj ect directly. See Star
(1999).
14. "Infra structure: Commentary from Nikhil Anand , johnathan Bach, julia Elyachar, and
Daniel Mains," Curated Collections, Cultural Anthropology Online, November 26 , 2012 , available
at http: //production.culanth.org/curated _collectionsl1l_ in frastructur e/d iscu ssions/6 -infrastruc
ture-commentary-from-nikhil-anand -johnathan_bach_julia -elyachar-and-daniel-mains (accessed
ja nuary 18, 2013).
15. Ibid .
16. See Da sgupta (2010) .
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state-initiated infrastructure project, but it was based on the public-private
partnership model. Studying water, which is considered sacred in the Hindu
imaginary, in its reincarnation as commodity opened up a new dimenSion to
explore how the market shifts the meaning of citizenship and belonging to
the nation-state. The new notion of belonging was gradually linking citizenship to consumption, where one can be acknowledged as a citizen only as a
consumer of services and products.
Treanor makes a compelling argument in this context, that neoliberalism
is "the desire to intenSify and expand the market, by increasing the number,
frequency, repeatability, and formalization oftransactions."17 To this formulation I would like to add that the desire for a new normativity based on the
market was ethnographically deep. As I started charting the Water Project,
besides the middle class I came to know slum residents, or "urban poor" as
they were officially categorized, who would be included in the new initiative.
The urban poor were now being asked to pay toward the project cost, which
was adjusted according to the square feet of their dwelling and also for the
water they would eventually consume. The urban poor characterized these
payments as "unacceptable demands" by the state since historically they received free water as a public service to those below the poverty line. The resistance to the market ideals started mounting as I began my work in the slums.
Over the past decades, the involvement of NGOS and community-based
organizations (CBOs) in development projects has become an established
norm, which is often labeled as "participation" of the beneficiaries in making
decisions about projects' designs and their implementation. International
donor agencies, such as the World Bank, have been influential in setting this
new paradigm in motion. Part of this initiative was meant to counter the
critique of the top-down model of the projects. However, on the other side,
with the spread of neoliberal values, the states in the developing world increaSingly came to be portrayed as "corrupt" institutions with a severe lack of
"transparency" and "accountability." This kind of dismal portrayal of public
governance was disseminated by the agencies like the World Bank and was
eagerly embraced by the rising middle class, particularly middle-class NGOs,
who were looking for an ideological sponsor to confine the role of the state
as a guarantor of the market economy. Scholars have noted the record rise of
NGOs and CBOs recently in countries like India. Baviskar writes, "Among the
social groups and associations that are considered to make up the civil society,
NGOs have become especially prominent in the last two decades" (2001: 1).
Thus, we need to ask whether we can substitute civil society in the Gramscian sense with NGOs' and CBOs' contributions. Though these organizations
stand apart from and yet are able to impact the state, can they represent class
17. Paul Treanor, "Neolib eralism: Origins, Theory, Definition," available at http: //www.web
.inter.nl. net/use rs/Pau l.Trea nor/neoliberalism.html, 9 (accessed April 6, 2015).
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interests equitably? Or do these emergences indicate a new form of class politics that is otherwise disguised in the name of the collective good?
Sharma and Bhide (2005), examining the World Bank- funded Slum
Sanitation Program (SSP) in Mumbai, have argued that the participation of
the slum dwellers was minimal despite the involvement of well-established
NGOs, such as the Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centers
(SPARC). I encountered a similar situation while working in the slums of
Bangalore, where one resident commented, to the ironic amusement of others,
"Yes, we will participate, because we are good at it." Therefore, rather than
rushing to evaluate "empowerment" achieved through participation, which
we often see in development agency reports, it is important to examine the
politics of "participation" itself.
Another recent issue that has surfaced in the development sphere is the
increasing donor participation of countries like India, China, and Brazil,
which were previously recipients of aid. As Emma Mawdsley has argued, the
fracturing of what was previously a domain of the Western powers has led to a
complex situation. She contends that this calls for a recalibration of "international relations and political economy of development" along with a departure
from the traditional analytical binaries such as "North-South," "East-Wes l ,"
"developed-developing," "First-Second-Thirds Worlds" (Mawdsley 2012: 3).
Elsewhere I have argued that Janaagraha's participation in the Water Project
was intended to delink participation from the sphere of development and
claim it for the market (Dasgupta 2012). As I discuss later, Janaagraha was
even reluctant to include the urban poor as a separate module in the participation structure. Their primary argument was "citizens" is already inclusive and
does not necessitate a separation by class. They finally agreed to do so only
when the Water and Sanitation Program (WSP) of the World Bank made it
mandatory for them to receive the funds. Such reluctance to involve the poor
based on class location or even labeling the Water Project as a "development
project" within a donor-recipient country like India, Signals the contemporary complexity of the field that Mawdsley discusses in her work.
Based on the above theoretical framework, some questions that arose in
my discussion with the slum residents were the following: What does it mean
to pay to connect to the main water pipe? Isn't it part of the government's
responsibility? Why do we have to pay for water now? What has changed?
Is the government no longer going to take care of the poor? Finally, where
is the water going to come from, since the river (meaning Cauvery) is so far
away? These questions unequivocally displayed the core problems of market
reforms. Together-the slum dwellers and I-were led to a space where the
otherwise "impeccable" logic of the market endorsed by IT was fraying at
the edges. Answers were difficult to come by, but the questions mattered.
Even when some state actors were confronted with these questions, they were
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befuddled. Contrary to the expectation of the IT narrative, the state was not
receding or reincarnating itself to make way for the market. Rather, what was
emerging was a state that was muddling through the new set of practices that
had descended on it.
My meeting with local councilors, who often used water to garner votes
in the slums, revealed that they were grappling with the new ideology and
government processes that they themselves barely understood. This was further demonstrated in my work with the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage
Board (Water Board),1B a para-statal agency bestowed with the task of supervising the implementation of the project. In several meetings I attended at the
Water Board, engineers who had years of experience working in the slums of
Bangalore were hesitant about charging the urban poor for water. The urban
poor, on the other hand, were deeply aware of this kind of predicament faced
by administrators and elected councilors. Nikhil Anand, in his work on water
supply in Mumbai settlements, argues that strategies to secure water invite
us to "move beyond binary theorizations of haves and have-nots that are
commonplace in writings about cities, especially those in the Global South"
(2011: 543). To think of reassigning water as a commodity under privatization
initiatives therefore is not merely about an added financial burden for the urban poor. Such changes further indicate the recession of final frontiers, water
in this case, that long enabled the urban poor to engage, even minimally, in
the power structure. The urban poor resistance to water privatization is not
archaic; it is, as Raymond Williams helps us reflect, "residual." The residual
is not "archaic" because it not "wholly recognized as an element of the past"
(Williams 1977: 122). In bringing the urban poor within the ambit of my
analysis, I want to suggest that despite their otherwise marginal locations,
their resistance is constitutive of the neoliberal discourse.

A

s I completed this manuscript, the contemporaneity that framed my
ethnography somewhat changed. However, the changes, rather than
negating, have come to reinforce the neoliberal system that I set out to study.
There are four issues that I feel compelled to address to resituate this work.
First, the current global economic downturn and its effect on the IT industry in India; second, the increasing role of IT entrepreneurs like Nilekani in
public governance and seeking public office and losing in the 2014 election;
third, the increasing middle-class "capture of the state" that is congealing as
a wider urban middle-class ethos rather than being confined to organizations such as Janaagraha; and, fourth, the 2014 election itself that catapulted
the Hindu fundamentalist party, BJP, to power at the center by a 53 percent
18. I still selectively use BWSSB while referring to forma l acts and policies.
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majority ending the coalition government phase, the norm -for some decades
now. Apparently these events seem disconnected and somewhat contradictory
because Nilekani's defeat may seem to be the demise of the IT ideology that
endorsed the market for public governance. However, when we consider that
Narendra Modi, the current prime minister of India and the leader of the
BJP, won on a platform of the "Gujarat Model of Development," which favors
the neoliberal agenda and is protective of what Modi himself has termed the
"neo-middle class," a more complex picture of the market-based ideology
emerges. The ideology now signals a wider emergence of a new middle-class
"capture of the state" to endorse marketplace consumerism. Further, as I show
in Chapter 3, while IT professionals may not endorse aggressive Hinduism,
sympathies for a lighter version of Hindu nationalism, or "Hindutva Lite,"19
was quite common, just like it is among middle-class India now.
The recent global economic downturn has undoubtedly affected the IT
industry in India since most of the clients of the industry are located in
the United States and Western Europe. Based on these findings, The Hindu
reported, "For the first time in 47 quarters, Infosys, hitherto the bellwether
of the sector, missed its revenue growth guidance. Its guidance for 2012-13
is just 8-10 per cent growth in U.S. dollar terms compared with the industry association National Association of Software and Service Compar,ies'
(NASSCOM's) guidance of 11-14 per cent."20
Though Infosys reported increased revenue in the April-June quarter in
2014, according to the International Business Times, the future projects of
the company are not as promising compared with the past since the company reduced its earnings per share gUidance for 2012 to 2.97 from its $3 .03
projection last year.21 The Wall Street Journal further reported that countries
such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Mexico pose a serious threat to the
outsourcing industry in India. 22
Despite the economic slump, IT entrepreneurs continue to significantly
carve out their space in public governance. As they had mentioned to me during my fieldwork, both Murthy and Nilekani had keen interest in reforming
the state and having India embark on a new path as a nation worth reckoning
within geopolitics. Nilekani contested the 2014 election from the Bangalore
South constituency on a Congress ticket but lost to his opponent, BJP candidate Ananth Kumar. In his speech, while conceding defeat, he pointed out
19. I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for suggesting this apposite term.
. 20. "Uncertain Tim es Ahead for Indian IT Sector," The Hindu , available at http://www.the
hll1du.com/todays-paper/tp -business/uncertain_times_ahead-for-indian-it-sector/art icle3440366
.ece (accessed October 2014).
21. Avai lable at http://www.ibtimes.comlindias-it-outsourcing_industry_faces-strain-global
-economlc-downturn-853539 (accessed October 29, 2012).
22. Available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304765304577478193970187
310.html (accessed October 29,2012).
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that "I am disappointed ... This is my first election. I've learnt a lot in this
election ... I will not quit politics. I will continue working for the Congress.
I will not only work for issues related to my constituency, but will continue
working for Bangalore."23 His intention of engaging in public governance
is not merely a matter of an election speech but points to his long-standing
involvement with the state.
In 2009 Nilekani stepped aside (not down) from his official corporate
position in Infosys to serve as the chairman of the new Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI). The UIDAI would implement the Aadhaar
Scheme, to endow citizens with a unique identification number and also
maintain a database of citizens' biometrics and other biographical data. The
idea was originally proposed by Infosys as a governance tool, particularly by
Nilekani, and it is thus not surprising that he was supervising the initiative.
The Aadhaar number is a tracking device similar to the social security number in the United States, but the official narrative states that it is meant to address election fraud and widespread embezzlement of funds that are especially
targeted toward poverty alleviation. Tracking populations, in a Foucauldian
framework, is a mark of govern mentality, and inducting an entrepreneur
to administer the system is indicative of a deeper change in the notion of
belonging and citizenship, something I argue in this book. Nilekani's role
in the state now reiterates my central thesis to understand the extent of the
IT success narrative beyond the domain of the industry. However, in 2014
Nilekani stepped down as the chairman of the UIDAI to run for office in the
nationwide elections.
Nevertheless, Nilekani's involvement was not unprecedented. The involvement of IT entrepreneurs in public governance has been an emerging
social practice for nearly two decades now. For instance, the construction of
the new airport was a major topic of discussion at Infosys while I was doing
fieldwork mainly because Narayan Murthy was its chairman at that time. The
old Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, or HAL, airport,24 which I used during
my fieldwork, was located in the southeastern part of the city. Being of modest
scope, it was able to handle a decent volume of air traffic. However, the new
airport, which would be built outside the city, was intended to expand the capacity of air traffic in and out of Bangalore. It was promoted as a major stride
in transforming Bangalore into a global city, and companies such as Larsen
and Toubro, Siemens, and Unique Zurich Airport were consulted for the airport design. In 2005 Narayana Murthy resigned as the chairman after being
criticized by H. D. Deve Gowda (former prime minister and then coalition
23. Available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/news/Election-results·2014·I-concede
-defeat-to-Ananth-Nandan-Nilekan i-says/a rticleshow/35227480.cms (accessed September 15,
2014).
24. Since 2008 the old airport has been used by HAL and the Indian air force for testing
purposes only.
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leader ofJanata Dal-Secular [JDS] with the Dharam Singh-led Congress) for
the delay in the construction and also on issues ofland. The controversy over
land allocation for the airport brought out issues that were related to land use
in general for urban development. The Joint House Committee investigated
the airport where Murthy, along with others involved, has been accused of a
"poor quality of workmanship» and the absence of an ambience that reflects
the specific "culture and glory of Karnataka» (Economic Times, December 22,
2009). Even the discourse that framed his resignation is quite revealing.
In a letter Murthy wrote to then chief minister Dharam Singh he mentioned his angst that the time and effort he had put in for five years were not
acknowledged. 2s What he did not reference in the letter or his press statements was the related allegation JDS brought about Infosys's application for
845 acres ofland in the peri-urban area of the city to expand its facilities. JDS
wanted an investigation into how land was being distributed to IT companies
and, based on that, whether Murthy was ethically qualified to represent the
private wing of a public-private infrastructural project?6 At Infosys, Murthy's
reSignation was construed as "unfortunate» not because it was seen as his loss,
but because of the state's inability to retain and appreciate, as one engineer
affectively put it, "an ethical and globally renowned entrepreneur who Wi13
willing to go beyond his duties as a citizen to end corruption and serve the
nation.»
When I mentioned the land issue to the engineers, it was once again cast
as the state's reluctance to appreciate IT's contribution to the nation. Murthy's
chairmanship, as the IT industry justified, aligned well with his "mentor»
pOSition to oversee innovative work both in Infosys as well as in public infrastructure. In terms of expertise, it is quite difficult to see the connection
between the two-software and airport-other than that they are both based
on neoliberal tenets. It was, however, known that since the airport would be
a critical node in global capitalism, Narayan Murthy was the obvious choice
considering his presence in worldwide business. However, Narendra Pani
(2006) reminds us that the new airport was just one of many instances of the
neoliberal urban reform agenda in Bangalore. The S. M. Krishna government,
Pani argues, would identify a set of infrastructural projects and then locate
private investors for them. This kind of approach is based on arriving at a
technical fix rather than addreSSing collective urban issues. Therefore, land
that was obtained as part of the airport project was based on market acquisition in place of eqUitable price.
S. M. Krishna, especially in founding BATF, aggressively extended public
governance to the private sector to reorganize the city. Nilekani, who headed
BATF, worked alongSide Ramesh Ramanathan, an ex-banker from London
25. Hindu Business Online, October 21, 2005.
26. Ibid.
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and New York, Devi Shetty, a prominent surgeon, and others to reform the
urban infrastructure that would facilitate the flow of global capital. Janaki
Nair has aptly described the coalition of IT entrepreneurs and other professionals charged with the new task of renewing Bangalore as the "captains
of the new economy." She argues that the focus of reform was "roads rather
than public transport, garbage and pollution rather than public housing"
(2005: 336). Matthew Gandy (2008) has noted similar middle-class politics,
particularly in reference to water supply in Mumbai. Gandy attributes the
dismal state of water supply to the slums to the "extent to which the Indian
state has been 'captured' by the middle classes so that its political agenda has
been consistently diverted from the universal provision of basic services"
(2008: 121). Added to this are middle-class "opt-out" strategies, such as bore
wells, pumps, and tankers to access water outside the state provisions, and
"environmental improvement," that is, to "clean up" the city for the "respectable citizens" (Gandy 2008). While the Hindu national Shiv Sena movement
altered the urban landscape of Mumbai, in Bangalore, the middle-class "capture of the state" was especially emboldened by state representatives, such as
S. M. Krishna.
The middle-class "capture of the state" has become a constitutive phenomenon in Indian polities visible in affective events such as the hunger
strike by Kishan Babu Rao Hazare (better known as Anna Hazare) in April
2011 to institute the Lokpal Bill (anticorruption bill) alongside the rise of the
Aam Aadmi Party (AAP; Party of the Ordinary Man) formed in 2012.27 Both
address the question of corruption and both involved overwhelming participation by the urban educated middle class. The middle-class exasperation
about state "corruption," the need for "transparency," and the involvement of
citizens in public governance has strengthened over the years, with the AAP
sweeping the Delhi Legislative Assembly Election in 2013, though they later
lost the 2014 general elections. In the meantime, Janaagraha, an organization
that proudly claims it is the "citizens' platform," had extended its work beyond
Bangalore with Ramesh Ramanathan being named as one of the members of
the Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission ONURM). The organization,
among other things, now manages a nationwide initiative titled "I Paid a
Bribe," where a person can anonymously report an incidence of corruption.
The website offers a visual image of "India's Corruption Monitor," which dynamically calculates the total amount paid in bribes, the number of reports
filed, and from which cities. The moral undertone is obvious; citizens and
27. Arvind Kejriwal, a former civil servant in the Indian Adminis trative Services (lAS), was
a prominent Right to Information (RTI) activist and a close associate of Kishan Babu Rao Hazare
in that initiative. However, they later split over the question of political engagement through the
electoral process, and Kejriwal went on to form the AAP. For a deta iled discussion of AAP, see Roy
(2014). For an analysis of the connection between the Anna Hazare movement and the contemporary middle class, see Sitapati (2011).
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state officials who refuse to engage in bribery are adulated as "Bribe Fighters"
and "Honest Officers," respectively.28
However, one of the issues that remain constant in my work and in the
work of other scholars who have examined urban middle-class activism
is the dominance of the supposed middle-class value of "honesty" and the
preeminence of the class based on education achievements. Roy, in analyzing
the "party-building" strategies of AAP, writes, "Sooner or later (party workers
would) return to the 'problem' of the slum voter," who, by participating in
"vote buying" to mitigate their harsh conditions, are key to their own misery
and, more importantly, in undermining the power of democracy (2014: 51).
Like the Anna Hazare movement, where corporate employees participated
widely, the AAP, whose leadership was often engaged in "management speak,"
and Janaagraha, as I show through my ethnography, were not only spaces
marked by and for the educated middle class; the pedagogical and didactic
mission to elevate the urban poor, with little effort to understand their social
context, was an unwavering pursuit. Together, these indicate the preeminence
of the middle class not simply as a growing consumer class but one that is
invested, directly or indirectly, in the "capture of the state," which has mostly
emerged from a sense of "minoritization and victimization" (Khandek r
2013) by the Indian state despite being law-abiding and taxpaying "honest"
citizens.
Corruption was a dominant theme in the 2014 elections, especially regarding the incumbent Congress-led United ProgreSSive Alliance (UPA). The
electoral pundits in the media and the BJP-led NDA (National Democratic
Alliance) made recurring references to the coal scam, the 2G Spectrum provision, the commonwealth game fiasco, the Aadarsh Housing scam, and so on.
The final victory of the BJP by a majority is therefore often attributed to the
BJP's assurance of a corruption-free nation. However, Chhibber, along with
his colleagues, has argued, "There is a crucial difference in how voters think
about corruption and how political parties and leaders represent this issue
in their campaigns. Voters care more about the corruption they encounter
on an everyday basis, whereas parties make the issue a spectacle" (Chhibber,
Shah, and Verma 2014). The everyday experience of corruption through which
notions of the state congeals is well documented in ethnographic work, as
well (Gupta 2005). Even when we look at the "I Paid a Bribe" initiative, the
focus is not necessarily on larger scams but the mundane, everyday nature
of soliciting, offering, or refuSing bribes. It is plausible that the everyday
experience of corruption may have resonated with the larger anticorruption
tenor of the BJP, which may have led to the win. Regardless, the urban middle
class is the single most powerful mouthpiece against corruption considering
28. Available at http: //www.ipaidabribe.com / bribe-trends#gsc.tab=O(accessed September 16,
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the perceived or real integrity of its members. Narendra Modi proactively
attended to this constituency during his campaign. Later in July his government's budget offered substantial concessions in income tax, savings, and
housing loans that disproportionately benefited the middle class ("Onwards
to the Neo-economy" 2014).
The other related aspect of the 2014 general election was the definite and
obsequious penchant for neoliberalism. Modi is supposed to have won by
endorsing the "developmental" agenda, drawing on the "Gujarat Model of
Development," the state where he was the chief minister. 29 However, scholars
like Jean Dreze (2014) have shown that when we consider Human Development Indexes (child well-being, food, shelter, schooling, health care, sanitation, and so on), Gujarat ranks nine out of the twenty in the state list, far
behind Tamil Nadu and Kerala in the south. Gujarat, Dreze (2014) contends,
is at best in the "middle" and definitely not the "model." Yet the question
remains, as Soundaraya Chidambaram (2014) has pointed out: How does
the electorate comprehend development-is it only a matter of GDP or are
social inequities taken into account? It is my argument, which aligns with
the ethnographic evidence that I present here, that the middle-class capture
of the state has shifted the politics of governance and belonging in India to
privilege public-private partnerships where the state is required to take a
progressively minimal role. Returning to the 2014 budget, it has eased the
flow of both foreign and domestic capital primarily through the promotion
of public-private partnerships.30 Overall, the contemporary shifts further
reinforce the economic and political processes that brought visibility to IT
and organizations like Janaagraha.
Finally, with BJP coming to power, a party that has strong ties with Hindu
fundamentalist organizations, such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangha
(RSS)/l dedicated to the promotion of Hindutva, the concern over whether
India is now officially entering the "saffron" (color of Hindu nationalism)
phase is legitimate. As an ideology, Hindutva was originally formulated
by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar in 1923 as a treatise titled (then published
anonymously) Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu. Hindutva, in Savarkar's exposition,
is not necessarily a religious identity; it is a historical confluence of "Hindus,
a Nation," a territory on the banks of the Sindhu' and a race united by the
"Common Culture," the common Sanskriti (civilization). However, this bond
between the land and the culture was interrupted by "foreign invaders,"
starting with the invasion of Muhammad of Ghazni in A.D. 1001, which led
to the conversion of a segment of the population to Islam, who then irrevers29. Available at http://www.narendramodLin/the-gujarat-model! (accessed September 17,
20 14).
30. See "Onwards to the Neo-economy" (2014) for a detailed discussion of the 2014 bud get.
3l. See http://www.rss.org for details about the organization.
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ibly ceased to be part of the land (Jaffrelot 2007). Savarkar's "othering" of the
Muslims is one of the prime tenets of Hindutva and underscores the fervent
narratives and practices of the RSS and the BJP to quite some extent.
Interestingly, Modi was strategically silent about Hindutva during his
election campaign, instead highlighting the "development" plan. This has attracted rather than distract scholars about the future of the nation since Modi
is a certified RSS activist (Teltumbde 2014). Anand Teltumbde has argued that
rather than taking the rigid approach, Modi is embracing a "soft approach
towards Hindutva by systematically saffronising [sic] institutions, as he did
in GUjarat," citing the instance of appointing Y. Sudershan Rao, a historian
who is known to have sought the virtue of the caste system and determine
dates of the epic Mahabharata (Teltumbde 2014: 11). Teltumbde also points
out that Hindutva aligns well with neoliberalism, which he terms "Saffron
Neoliberalism." Both are designed to privilege the already privileged, the
Hindus and upper classes, respectively (Teltumbde 2014). The link between
the urban middle-class Hindus, for instance, in Infosys and Janaagraha, and
Hindutva is not the kind espoused by RSS, but it aligns rather well with Modi's approach, which as I mentioned earlier, can be thought of as "Hindu tva
Lite." During my ethnographic work I seldom encountered overt referenc:es
to Hindutva, but the underscoring narrative upheld what was often seen as
an intrinsic connection between Hinduism and science. The pride in the success of IT among software developers in Infosys or middle-class activism in
Janaagraha were anchored to a vision that had little space for the "other," the
"other" being Muslims or the lower classes. In a national political context that
assembles Hindutva, sCience, and the neoliberal market in an unprecedented
synthesis, the shifting grounds of public governance that I document here
have reached a new level oflegitimacy.

T

he ethnographic work for this book was based in Bangalore, but prior
to starting the research, I had also considered Hyderabad as a potential
site. Though other Indian cities feature in the success of the IT industry,
the Bangalore-Hyderabad dyad is by far the most important because of the
exclusive initiatives taken by Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, the respective
state governments. Bangalore nonetheless was historically connected to the
science and technology imagination of the nation-building era following
independence in 1947. TI10ugh the development of the IT industry was finallya matter of government policies both at the central and state level and
entrepreneurial initiatives, Bangalore was already available as a space marked
by infrastructural industries. These industries were established as part of
the nationalist project for technological and scientific self-reliance. Before it
became the "Silicon Valley of India," it was known as the "science capital"
of the country for its public-sector industries such as the Indian Telephone
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Industries (1948), Hindustan Machine Tools (1953), Bharat Electronics (1954),
Hindustan Aeronautics (1964), Hindustan Copper (1967), and Bharat Earth
Movers (1967). These industries, despite the decline of their standing after
the advent of IT, are still present in the collective memory, both inside and
outside IT, and they offer a preamble to the new industry. The city, as I discuss
in Chapter 3, was also the erstwhile hub of multinational companies such as
IBM, which left India in 1978 to return again in 1992.
The 2004 election was decisive especially for urban renewal plans in
Bangalore. S. M. Krishna, the chief minister of Karnataka and the architect
of Bangalore as a global city, lost the election, and agony over his defeat was
widespread both in Infosys and Janaagraha. His defeat was seen as a threat
and a setback to the neoliberal agenda in Bangalore. When state power is coopted, compromised, and weakened, it calls for a critical definition of power
that not only looks at the "capture" by the middle class but also at the subversions the poor engage in to survive. The middle-class "capture" of the state is
mainly justified as a necessary and ethical antidote to "corruption." However,
as Gandy has contended, "The term 'corruption' .. . actually masks an array
of different practices and needs to be more carefully differentiated" (2008:
117). In the case of water supply, as Gandy also notes, practices that I have
noticed range from bribing for prompt connections, additional payment for
dedicated water lines (common for gated communities, which mention 2417
water supply), illegal connections to the main water pipe, and so on. Though
I have known these practices to be common both in middle -class neighborhoods and slums, the middle-class engagement with "corruption" is supposedly prompted by the failure of the state, whereas that of the urban poor is
seen as downright illegal. Therefore, the task is to understand the practices
and ideologies through which middle-class intrusion into governance can be
honored as "reformative," while that of the poor is deplored as "delinquent."32
The parochial commitment to urban renewal had implications beyond the
city; it seriously affected the rural sector. S. M. Krishna's term also coincided
with farmers' suicides in Karnataka, along with other states, which is usually linked to his eventual defeat in the 2004 elections. Based on the findings
of the Madras Institute of Development Studies, a research organization in
Chennai, The Hindu published comparative data in an opinion piece titled
"Farm Suicides Worsen after 2001: A Study" in 2007.33 Karnataka ranked as
one of the highest in the country for farmer suicides, leading us to recognize
the unfortunate agrarian crisis unleashed by the commercialization of agriculture during the 1990s.34
32. For a discussion on the anthropology of corruption, see Holler and Shore (2005).
33. Available at http://www.hindu.com12007/ 11/13/stories/2007111352250900.ht m (accessed
April 12, 2013).
34. For a detailed analysis of the farme rs' suicide, see Vasavi (1999).

24

Introduction

Biotechnology is another important sector of the neoliberal plan in Bangalore. Lawrence Liang has written about farmers' protests against "biotechnology and the patenting of seeds and life forms." He specifically mentions
the one organized by the Karnataka Rajya Raitha Sangha in front of KFC. 35
Vandana Shiva (2008) has argued extensively about farmer suicides in the
context of seed monopolies introduced by corporations such as Monsanto.
Shiva mentions four states-Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and
the Punjab-where especially farmers who grow cotton, a cash crop, succumbed. Citing the International Food Policy Research Institute's discussion
paper "Bt-Cotton and Farmers' Suicide in India: Reviewing the Evidence,"
she argues that it completely misplaced the suicide events as a "long-term
phenomenon" when these happened between 1997 and 2007, affecting nearly
160,000 farmers. 36
Such misplaced narratives are especially troubling in cities like Bangalore
where farmer suicides are incommensurable with the aspiring global image.
The newspapers often reported Krishna visiting the farmer's family after the
suicide, but the priority of his regime clearly abandoned the agrarian crisis.
The overall silence around such suicides during my fieldwork was intriguing.
The majority of people I talked to about the farmers' suicide perceived th,.:se
as isolated problems, and very few even made a connection to the Krishna
government's lopsided preference to reinforce urban governance.

T

he collaboration between corporations and the state is not new in India.
Other IT companies, which have a longer history with the Indian state in
the pre-IT era, such as Tata Consultancy Services (TCS)37 and Wipro 38 have
also dedicated their profits to social causes through programs of corporate
social responsibility (CSR). Infosys, like all the other corporations, has its
own CSR, known as the Infosys Foundation established in 1996. The found a-

35. Available at http://www.tO.or.at/w io/downloads/india/liang.pdf (accessed October 22,
2013).
36. To see the distribution of farmers' suicide between 1995 and 2010, see http: //www. the
hindu.com/multimedia/archive/00820/Farm_Suicides __ All __ 820602a .pdf and "In 16 Years,
Farm Suicides Cross a Quarter Million," TIle Hindu , available at http://www.thehindu.com/opin
Ion Icolum nsls a in a th Iin -16 -yea rs -farm -s u i cid es- cro ss- a _q uarter- million/a r ticle2 5 77 6 3 5. ece
(accessed October 22, 2013).
37. TCS was established in 1968 and is part of the Tata Group, which was founded by Jamsetji
Tata 111 1868. After independence in 1947, the Tata Group was one of the main industrial conglol.nerates that invested significantly in infrastructural projects to participate and promote in the
nation-buIlding project.
38. Wipro, which was earlier known as Western India Products Limited, was established in
1945 to manufacture and sell consumer products, especially household products such as Sunflower
Vanaspati (c.ooking) oil, soaps, and so on. The company stepped into the hardware and software
~T 1I1dustry 111 the 1980s and in the 1990s rose to global prominence along with other companies
111 Bangalore.
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tion, under the chairpersonship of Sudha Murthy, wife of Narayan Murthy,
donates 1 percent of the company profit (after tax 39 ) to the development of
basic amenities in rural areas in Karnataka and neighboring states. Two issues
led me away from focusing on CSR. First, I was not interested in isolated acts
of altruism or benevolence because they rarely address social inequality as
structural violence; rather often these programs perpetuate the status quo. In
saying this, I am not suggesting that Infosys's critique of the state questions issues of social injustice; rather it builds its ideology on existing forms of social
inequality while attempting to introduce new ones through ownership and
private property. However, the ethico-political critique that I am proposing
here seeks a deeper political and economic transformation that is not limited
to isolated attempts (building schools, hospitals digging wells, raising flood
relief, and so on) to "help" the rural poor.
The critique is an attempt to overhaul the governance apparatus in a specific way, that is, to replace the socialist-redistributive model with one based
on the neoliberal market. Second, the Infosys-Janaagraha bond for transforming governance was singularly focused on the city, which was seen as an
important node in the circuit of global capital. One of Janaagraha's missions
was to revitalize urban politics and the urban domain, which it argued had
suffered because of state policies that privileged the agrarian economy and the
rural sector. My inclusion of the Water Project alongside software illustrates
this argument. The historical amnesia is deeply linked to the ethico-political
critique because while attempting to reform the nation-state, the InfosysJanaagraha collaborative erases its past as problematic and burdensome. The
claim I make in this book is not about interchanging Infosys with IT and then
extending the argument to India as a whole. Instead I think ofInfosys as amply reformative based on its corporate power, to be able to initiate changes in
the government apparatus not only at the state level but also at the level of the
central government. Nevertheless, this could only happen at a certain moment
in the history of the nation-state, and my intention is to capture the political nuances of that moment ethnographically. Therefore, this book explores
emerging alliances that recalibrate the relationship between state and citizens.

O

ver the last two decades, the rise of IT in general, and in India specifically, has generated significant interest among scholars across disciplines in the context of globalization, neoliberalism, its implications for
transnational labor, and so on. Manuel Castells's (1989) "information SOciety"
(informational economy, global economy, network enterprise, flexi-workers,
timeless time, annihilation of time, space of flows) comes to mind; he offers
39. This was specifically emphasized as I was learning about the Foundation during my field-

work.
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us ways to theorize the restructuring of capitalism transformed primarily
by the IT revolution in information processing. Other scholars have focused
specifically on the Indian IT industry. For instance, in their edited volume,
Carol Upadhya and A. R. Vasavi explore the various facets of the Indian IT
industry at the intersection of culture, corporate management, the production
of the Indian techie, labor processes, gender, and so on. In Virtual Migration,
Aneesh Aneesh (2006) offers us a reading of the outsourced model of software development as the decoupling of the "body" from its "performance." It
generates, he argues, a different kind of temporal integration when servers,
software engineers, and clients are differentially located across incongruous
geographies and time zones. Christopher Kelty's (2008) Two Bits focuses
on free or open-source software and how it leads to the emergence of what
he calls a "recursive public." A recursive public is a specific kind of public,
composed of "geeks" who are at the forefront of establishing a different kind
of public space that contests existing forms of power. In terms of power, free
software, which developed rather unexpectedly, counters all that is associated
with economic history, especially with capitalism, such as "private ownership"
and "individual autonomy." I knew a handful of geeks at Infosys who were
committed to open-source software, which was quite in contradiction wi h
the capitalistic mission of the company. TI10ugh my research does not focus
on the politics of open source, Kelty's work was helpful for me to think about
the politics that underscore software development work, such as the sharing of
tacit knowledge. Kelty's work, unlike mine and like the other works I mention
here, once again is multisited. In mapping a "distributed phenomenon ethnographically," his work was spread over Bangalore, Boston, Berlin, and Houston.
Another area of focus in this literature has been on gender. Men, especially in the upper echelons of companies, dominate the IT industry. This is
immediately Visible, and the IT industry is marked by a gender inequity that
is quite characteristic of the industry itself. The ideal software programmer
is a man ideally without a family. If he is married, the wife is expected to be
in a supporting role, helping the man climb the corporate ladder (Devi 2002).
Women programmers I knew at Infosys often complained about managing
long hours of commute, work, domestic responsibilities, and family obligations, especially toward in-laws. A few women also reported that to help them
advance professionally, their parents were taking care of their children, who
occasionally lived in other cities. Then there was the question of international
travel to a client site, which most women were either not offered, had to pass,
or had to accept along with the emotional cost of "abandoning" their children. At the time of my fieldwork there was a conversation about opening a
daycare for the employees' children at Infosys, but most of those meetings
were organized and attended by women. The implication for gender equity in
a neoliberal context that purportedly upholds individual pursuits is favorably
skewed toward men.
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Scholars such as Winifred Poster (2013), Danielle van Jaarsveld and Poster
(2013), Reena Patel (2010), and Rupal Oza (2006) analyzed labor relations
between the West and India as a function of time zone differences and their
implications for questions of personhood, gender, and the circadian rhythm.
Smitha Radhakrishnan's Appropriately Indian: Gender and Culture in a New
Transnational Class "is about the culture ofIndia's IT professionals-a culture
that powerfully reconciles the 'global' and the 'Indian' with one another to
create a simplified, influential notion of a new Indian culture that is compatible with the economic and geographic mobility of the global economy" (2011:
3). The relationship between gender and neoliberalism has taken another
critical turn with reports of violence against women who work late hours in
the urban business processing outsourcing (BPO) companies, especially the
call centers. 40 This raises an important question about the enduring marginalized place of women in an economy that is otherwise perceived to be enabling
individual aspirations. On the other hand, because often the men accused and
convicted in these violence cases are also from the lower class and/or rural
migrants, the divide between the "progressive" city and the "regressive" village grows exponentially.
Gender's relation to water is an important feature in the literature. While
I do not explore this specific connection, the fact that my ethnography on
water dwells mostly on women is pertinent. In the face of water scarcity in
the slums, women were largely responsible for collecting water for the family,
and especially making sure that the men had enough water to use. This ranged
from walking several miles to a public fountain to placing pots and buckets
in the queue when water was released for the slum. Further, when we look
into developmental projects like the Water Project, gender takes on a different
character, an issue donor agency personnel often overlooked. 41 During the
meetings the Water Board held in the slums to explain the advantages of the
Water Project, the voices and opinions of the male residents were most active
and effective. Therefore, the chasm between the water chores and the power
and decision making followed a strict gendered line. 42
Caste is another subject that scholars have explored in their examination
of the IT industry. In my ethnography it was clear that the IT industry positions itself as an open forum, where success is based purely on achievement.
Unlike traditional sectors where ascriptive status matters, IT is perceived to
be based solely on "merit." However, the constitution of founders and employees at Infosys (and other companies) is Significantly dominated by the upper
40. The Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry in India released a report in January
2013 highlighting declining fema le work productivity in the BPO sector. Available at http://www
.assocham.org/prels/shownews.php?id=3843 (accessed October 20,2014) .
41. See Coles and Wallace (2005).
42 . For the politics of gender in the case of water, see Lahiri-Dutt (2006) and Coles and
Wallace (2005).
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castes (and upper class). In her study of software professionals in Bangalore,
which examined educational opportunities available to upper-caste (and
upper-class) urban citizens and recruitment strategies ofIT companies, Carol
Upadhya (2004) showed that there is a critical gap between the IT rhetoric
of "merit" and the actual reality.43 The exclusionary practices of IT has certainly expanded the middle caste-class beyond the traditional professions
(professors, lawyers, doctors, engineers, and so on) but in the process has also
deepened social inequalities.44
While the above literature has shaped my thinking, my own query is
somewhat different. What continues to be either explicit or implicit in the
research is the idea that globalization exists as an intangible network that recruits the nation-state as its appendage. I am not claiming that the network is
prior to the nation-state or vice versa, where scholars also debate over the demise or resurgence of state sovereignty. This is not a matter of succession, but
of how the global network and the nation-state influence governance practices
in the name of neoliberal reforms. In other words, how does one experience,
endorse, or resist neoliberal changes in everyday life? My ethnography on the
creation of the water market is meant to trace the processes through which
people variously encounter its change from a basic amenity to a commod '(y.
Saskia Sassen (2005) argues that the capacities for global operation, coordination, and control contained in the new information technologies and
in the power of transnational corporations need to be actualized. I extend
Sassen's formulation to further argue that this embeddedness is not merely
a question of actualizing place but also an invitation to historiography. In
this sense the practices, discourses, and processes of neoliberal global capital
cannot be detached from, to reference Michel Foucault, the "history of the
present." The "history of the present" of IT is not about the historical background but how the past gets written into the present. Therefore, distinct from
the scholars I am in conversation with, I attend to the question of globalization, neoliberalization, and IT by visiting the postcolonial historiography. In
fact, I argue that the postcolonial condition constitutes, deploys, and resists
global forces in a way that is reminiscent of an earlier imperial past, a travail
we cannot ignore.
My interest in IT does not exclusively focus on its global network of
flows of capital, software, and programmers. Rather, I am interested in its
politics within the nation-state and how it bears on the issue of citizenship
and belonging. Can this work be considered multisited? Though I remained
i~ Bangalore, I did travel through disjunctive and incongruous spaces in the
cIty. For example, a typical day in Bangalore involved a negotiation between
43. For furth er discussion on how edu cation plays a role in IT, see Krishna and Brihmadesam
(2 006) and Fuller and Naras imhan (2006, 2010).
44. For a caste -class continuum, see Fuller and Narasimhan (2014).
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the filth-logged storm drains in the slums and the opulent spaces of IT corporations. Ethnography in such incommensurable spaces may be termed
multitemporal because, in the IT discourse, it represents a linear progression
from "backwardness" to "modernity." Contrary to its promises, neither globalization nor neoliberalization has generated an even political terrain. By
political terrain I mean the global as well as the national terrain. This work is
an attempt to map the ruggedness of this uneven terrain as a way to show how
the IT narrative differentially affects everyday lives of hierarchically placed
populations. Ethnography is a particularly useful method in this enterprise
because it compels the researcher to follow a story not for its cohesiveness but
for its abundant missing pieces.

T

he book is organized based on the following chapters. Along with an
outline of the manuscript, the first chapter, "The Politics of Distrust,"
introduces the various sites in and through which I came to formulate the
project, moving back and forth spatially among them rather than offering
a chronology of events. Methodologically, these sites intertwine in terms of
their shared investment in thinking about "India," "Bangalore," "citizenship,"
and "governance." Here I propose a heuristic binary tool-"inside" and "outside" IT-to show how these notions are constructed and contested along class
lines. The inside ofIT is the domain of software development, where work and
human processes intertwine to meet the stipulations of the global economy.
The outside, however, is not merely what lies outside IT or is excluded from
it. Rather, I deploy the "outside" as a way to reverse our gaze on IT. Therefore,
instead oflooking outside from inside IT, the outside offers a critical analysis
when we look into IT. The outside is where the Water Project is located, but it
is also a multilayered and contested domain where different classes lay their
claims to the city. The inside-outside is not a dichotomy that is sealed; it is the
new porosity between the two otherwise unrelated domains, that is, software
and water. These now converge in the neoliberal discourse and offer us a way
to revisit the question of citizenship and belonging.
Chapter 2, "Market Experiments and Peripheral Lives," discusses the
basis of why I bring the two domains-water and software-under the same
rubric of analysis. It explains how these domains become commensurate in
thinking about citizenship and governance. I provide the details of the Water
Project and explain how it is considered unprecedented in India in the area
of public infrastructure work. For example, the citizens' contribution toward
the capital cost and their participation in monitoring the project as one of
the stakeholders are two of its unique features. It also discusses WSP's interest in funding the "citizen participation" module and International Finance
Corporation's insistence on privatizing the water supply. Interestingly, though
the Water Board was administering the Water Project, the territory that was
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included, that is, the peripheral region circling the city of Bangalore known
as Greater Bangalore (the area was later merged with the city), was technically
beyond the limits ofBangalore Mahanagar Palike. I specifically highlight this
peripheral region as an "available" space for neoliberal experiments. I show
the parallels that emerge between a software/corporate project and a state/
public project where one's participation is circumscribed only as a worthwhile
"stakeholder" in the market.
"Software Nation," Chapter 3, explores the internal processes of the IT
industry, focusing on several different units in Infosys that handle different
segments of the job. It would be safe to consider this chapter as the ethnography of IT. However, I extend this ethnography to decipher a "blueprint" of
governance and citizenship that is pOSSibly emanating from within this domain. Through this ethnographic account, one encounters not only desirable
and successful citizens but also ethical corporate governance practices that
Infosys claims it closely adheres to. Here I mainly focus on the following set of
questions: What are possible indicators through which we can recognize this
blueprint, as Raymond Williams suggests, as "emergent" and "residual"? How
are these new indicators constructed as a neutral body of governance tools
that can seamlessly alternate between corporate and the public governance?
What makes such alternations possible? Why now?
I explore one aspect of the success narrative that I encountered regularly
at Infosys-"We put India on the map"-in Chapter 4, "Travails of Time."
This segment of the narrative is ahistorical in the sense that it frames IT as a
sudden occurrence that not only marks India's departure from a troublesome
colonial past but is also delinked from the "corrupt" postcolonial present.
Chapter 4 interrogates this notion of departure and delinking. I show how
despite all its claims, IT in fact folds in what we may call a "history of the present" through a selective borrowing and denial of the past. Issues of belonging
and citizenship are underscored by contestations through time; therefore, this
chapter attempts to anchor IT in historiography, not to provide a historical
background but to understand the changing terrain of the nation-state with
the emergence of neoliberalism. I pay special attention to the reemergence of
Gandhi as the new referent and the simultaneous demise of Nehru in the IT
narrative to attend to the question of history.
Chapter 5, "The Black Box," deliberates on how although the neoliberal
reform agenda privileges the upper classes given their economic strength, the
urban poor were omnipresent. Their presence had little to do with inclusion
but was a question in itself: What is to be done with the poor? The poor were
clearly "reSidual" yet persistent in disrupting the neatness of the neoliberal
picture. DraWing on my ethnographic work in a slum in Bangalore, Manjunathanagara, which was part of the Water Project, ·the urban poor question
was critical in two ways. First, Janaagraha devoted a Significant amount of
time to what it called the "urban poor question," basically trying to incorpo-

Intro duction

31

rate them within a framework that otherwise was designed for middle-class
citizens to participate in the Water Project. Second, the urban poor themselves were resisting the payment that would be incumbent if water supply was
privatized. Related to this, they would lose a vote-bargaining strategy with
their local councilors. Through this chapter I show that the experience of neoliberalism is far from being a monolith and that the market is not necessarily
a tool favorable for allocation of resources since it tends to homogenize the
polity despite its clear discontinuities. As I mention in Chapter I, the urban
poor on the "outside" of IT, in fact, lend us a different looking glass through
which we consider the politics of the market reform. This chapter reverses our
gaze on IT. It compels us to pause and think about how market reforms are
reinforcing existing forms of inequality while instituting new ones. Finally, in
the conclusion, "BITS of Belonging," I revisit the question of postcolonialness
and the restlessness that marks its continued departure from a past that is
degrading. The success narrative ofIT is one such instance that attaches itself
to the neoliberal ideology to argue for the renewal of the nation-state. Yet, as I
show, this renewal is limited in terms of who can now belong as a substantive
citizen-that now one can only belong in bits.
I call this book BITS of Belonging to tell a complex story of postliberalization India, particularly how the disenfranchised population copes with the
changing political paradigm and devises new strategies to make claims to the
nation-state. This claim, as I see through my work, is a fractured reality-a
binary of 0 and I-as in a computer BIT. Neither 0 nor 1 matter as entities; the
various combinations of the two constitute a legitimate software program. The
combination has a predetermined and limited field of possibilities. Likewise,
belonging ceases to have an amorphous stance and becomes a definite combination of politics, ideology, and economics to be recognizable as a legitimate
way to exist in the nation-state. Yet the urban poor contest this form of citizenship as a way to continue their claim on the state. In this sense citizenship
and governance are both a venue for reformation as well as a contestation.
The success story of IT, despite its reassuring tone, serendipitously becomes
a conduit to class politics that reflects that liberalization, or globalization, for
that matter, is far from a panacea.

